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Sub-National Human Rights Institutions: A Definition and Typology 
 
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that independent governmental human rights bodies at the sub-
national level now comprise a meaningful group that can be understood as a sub-national 
counterpart to National Human Rights Institutions. In accordance with the term’s growing usage 
among human rights practitioners, I label these bodies as ‘Sub-national Human Rights 
Institutions’ (‘SNHRIs’). So far, however, SNHRIs (as a general concept) have been the subject 
of very little academic attention, although there have been many studies of individual SNHRIs or 
particular types of SNHRIs. With the objective of promoting coherent and generalizable research 
into this relatively new institutional concept, in this paper I therefore stipulate and justify a 
general SNHRI definition and a scientific typology of SNHRIs based on administrative level, 
institutional form, and breadth of mandate. 
 
Keywords: Ombudsman; Human Rights Commission; federalism; typology; National Human 
Rights Institution 
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I. Introduction 
In this article, I undertake three tasks. First, I argue that there exists a meaningful group 
of governmental human rights bodies characterized principally by their independence and sub-
national mandate. I label these bodies as ‘Sub-National Human Rights Institutions’ (‘SNHRIs’). 
Second, I stipulate a general definition for SNHRIs, namely that they are independent non-
judicial governmental institutions that possess a sub-national mandate, and whose mission 
includes the implementation of human rights norms. This definition is then elucidated at a second 
level of specificity, with definitional choices justified and hard cases highlighted. Third, I 
propose a multi-variable typology of SNHRIs. This typology is crafted so as to be 
comprehensive and exclusive, and is based on three variables: administrative level; institutional 
type, and breadth of mandate.  
My intent in this paper is to lay the groundwork for future research and analysis of 
SNHRIs.
1
 While definition and classification are often neglected undertakings in the human 
rights literature, they play fundamental roles in the scientific enterprise (Bailey 1994, 1; 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1996, 28; Sartori 2009, 170). When there are multiple 
definitions (or a lack of definitions) for a concept being studied, then the extent to which any 
particular research findings are generally applicable often remains unclear (Frankfort-Nachmias 
and Nachmias 1996, 27; Gerring and Barresi 2003, 202). Knowledge accumulation and 
productive argumentation remain difficult (Gerring and Barresi 2009, 241) and comparative 
studies suffer from the lack of a common framework to conduct research and present findings 
(Sartori 1970, 1039; Mair 2008, 177). As one researcher notes, “[a]rguably, the most fruitful 
research programs in social science—those that produce the most knowledge—are those in 
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which the key concepts are agreed on and defined the same way by all” (Mueller 2003, 162). 
Typologies are likewise fundamental to academic research. Descriptive social science typologies 
contribute to “forming and refining concepts, drawing out underlying dimensions, creating 
categories for classification and measurement, and sorting cases” (Collier et al. 2012, 217). 
Typologies also allow researchers to understand relationships among related phenomena, and can 
help highlight under-explored areas (Eppler and Mengis 2011, 7).  
 It is particularly important to establish an accepted general definition and typology for a 
concept at an early stage of research into that concept, in order to avoid the evolution of multiple 
divergent definitions as a research program develops (Mueller 2003, 162; Sartori 2009, 172). 
National Human Rights Institutions (‘NHRIs’) may in this respect provide something of a 
cautionary tale: over the past two decades, a large number of (sometime wildly) different NHRI 
definitions and typologies have been proposed in different situations, with the result being that it 
is difficult to generalize conclusions from studies that utilize a range of definitions and 
typologies.
2
 In addition, the first generation of NHRI research largely focused on descriptive 
analyses of institutional design and effectiveness, with little of the systematic social scientific 
investigation that one might have expected to see, given the large number of NHRIs and the 
diversity among them (Cardenas 2012, 32). While there are various possible reasons for this, the 
lack of an accepted definition and typology that could be used for structured comparisons or the 
construction of a large-n dataset has arguably contributed to this research underdevelopment, and 
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 According to one report, “there are as many typologies of NHRIs as papers written about them” 
(International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2005: 6). 
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by extension to the widely held view that NHRIs are still “undertheorized and not well 
understood” (Goodman and Pegram 2012, 3).3      
 With regards to the SNHRI concept however, academic research is indeed in its earliest 
stages. With a few exceptions, academic books and articles have only in passing mentioned 
SNHRIs (Cardenas 2001, 8; Reif 2014, 223) or related terms such as “sub-national human rights 
bodies” (Petersen 2011, 205), “human rights institutions at a sub-national level” (Carver 2011, 5), 
or “subnational NHRIs” (Reif 2012, 70). By setting forth a general SNHRI definition and 
typology, this article will thus allow for a more coherent and helpful research agenda to develop 
moving forward. While the precise details of a future SNHRI research agenda are impossible to 
know, some likely directions can be predicted based on existing strands of NHRI research. For 
example one might expect to see research into the reasons for SNHRI proliferation in the past 
few decades, just as studies have addressed the analogous question for NHRIs (Cardenas 2014; 
Koo and Ramirez 2009; Pegram 2010). An accepted SNHRI definition and typology would 
allow researchers to measure the extent of such proliferation (or compare the degree of 
proliferation in different jurisdictions) and to explore whether the reasons for proliferation are 
the same for different types. One might also expect to see research on the conditions leading to 
SNHRI effectiveness, just as researchers have analyzed the conditions under which NHRIs can 
be effective (Goodman and Pegram 2012, 2; International Council on Human Rights Policy 
2005). An accepted SNHRI typology, however, would help scholars to more clearly delineate the 
scope of generalizability of their (and other authors’) conclusions on conditions for SNHRI 
effectiveness in a more precise and nuanced manner.  
                                                          
3
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approaches, and at least one NHRI data collection project is currently underway (Conrad et al, 
2012). 
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II. SNHRIs as a Meaningful Concept 
 Over the past three decades, human rights institutions have proliferated at the sub-
national level, just as they have done at the national level. To illustrate with a few numbers, there 
are reported to now be seventy-one regional human rights ombudsmen in Russia (ECRI 2013 
40),
4
 thirty-two state human rights commissions in Mexico (Acosta 2012, 433), and twenty-three 
state human rights commissions in India (Dobhal et al. 2014, 11). At the local level, there are at 
least 1,000 personeros municipales
 
in Colombia (Wolman 2015a, 227) and over forty local 
human rights ombudsmen in Catalonia (Molin 2010), to pick just two parts of the world.  
 Like NHRIS, these SNHRIs vary significantly in their power and effectiveness. In at least 
some cases, however, they appear to have made a meaningful impact in local human rights 
promotion and prevention. The Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission, to give one 
example, has been called “arguably one of the more effective human rights bodies in the region”; 
one of its most significant successes was its use of strategic litigation to challenge the system for 
allocating students to different secondary schools (Petersen 2011, 205). At the municipal level, 
one example of a human rights friendly policy informed and inspired by an SNHRI is the York 
(U.K.) Equality Scheme, which was in part based upon a report by the York Fairness 
Commission’s (Berends et al, 153). 
 Until very recently, however, these various bodies were seldom conceptualized as 
exemplars of a general institutional type. Rather, such institutions were simply seen by observers 
as examples of city human rights commissions or provincial anti-discrimination commissions 
and the like, as usually defined by administrative level, institutional character and geography. 
                                                          
4
 The term ‘ombudsman’ is gender-neutral in the Swedish language from which it originates, and 
this formulation remains in common usage, although some localities have switched to the term 
‘ombudsperson’. In this article, I use the term ‘ombudsman’ in a gender-neutral sense. 
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Research on them has accordingly been generally confined to case studies of specific institutions, 
or of particular institutional types within a given country or region (see, e.g., Dünser 2004; 
Saunders and Bang 2007; Vitale 2014; Hong 2015). This perspective is now inadequate, 
however: there is a need for research into SNHRIs as a general institutional type (in addition, of 
course, to research into specific institutions or institutional sub-types). This is the case for three 
primary reasons. 
First, the human rights community has, over the past two decades, thoroughly embraced 
the NHRI concept as a significant institutional category for both research and practical purposes 
at the national level. At the global level, the UN increasingly encourages NHRI participation and 
establishment, while the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (‘GANHRI’) 
accredits and NHRIs and builds NHRI capacity.
5
 Dozens of political science and law scholars 
now focus on NHRIs as relevant analytical categories. This focus on NHRIs inevitably brings up 
questions related to NHRIs’ subnational counterparts. Just as two decades ago, one might 
reasonably have asked whether findings from ombudsman research conducted at the national 
level also applies to local ombudsmen, so must scholars ask today whether the voluminous 
quantity of NHRI research findings accrued over the past twenty years also applies to SNHRIs, 
how SNHRIs relate to NHRIs, the advantages and disadvantages of SNHRIs compared to NHRIs, 
and similar questions.  
Second, the lines dividing traditional categories of subnational human rights institutions 
are in many cases becoming blurred. As has happened at the national level, many subnational 
classical ombudsman institutions have started to see human rights implementation as part of their 
mission, despite human rights not being part of their mandate. In many Mexican states, human 
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rights commissions have been established that resemble traditional defensores del pueblo more 
than classic common law commissions (Gaos 2004, 147). U.S. commissions that formerly 
concentrated solely on racial discrimination are now being given mandates that encompass the 
entire human rights corpus (Kaufman 2011, 89). In short, while one can still distinguish between 
different SNHRI types (which is why a typology is useful), the dividing lines are no longer as 
distinct as they once were, and the commonalities are greater. There are various reasons for these 
shifts, but one consequence is that for many purposes it makes sense to study SNHRIs as a 
general type, because members of different traditional sub-types increasingly share common 
traits.  
Third, SNHRIs are becoming more active at the international level by, for example, 
participating in UN forums, filing reports on local human rights conditions, and applying for 
membership at the GANHRI (Wolman 2014). International actors must therefore develop rules 
and guidelines for this participation, and decide when and how to encourage and support the 
work of SNHRIs. To a certain extent, this is a work in progress: the UN Human Rights Council 
is currently engaged in a research project on local governments and human rights (which 
includes surveys of SNHRIs and other actors), while the GANHRI has struggled with the 
question of SNHRI membership (Wolman 2015b). But from a conceptual standpoint, it is clear 
that both these organizations are in the process of developing policy with respect to SNHRIs as a 
group. Thus, while SNHRIs may still be domestically viewed primarily as local institutional 
types, at the international level they are increasingly seen as members of a broader global group. 
As evidence of this shift, one can note the growing contemporary usage of the term ‘sub-national 
human rights institution’ by important international actors such as the UN Secretary General 
(2011, para. 95), the High Commissioner of Human Rights (Pillay 2011; UNHCHR 2011), the 
 8 
UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing (Farha 2014, para. 76(j)), and UNICEF (2013, 
105). Other prominent human rights actors have used (presumably) similar phrases such as 
“regional and local human rights institutions” (Hammarberg 2009, para. 7.2), “local human 
rights institutions” (Kang 2012), “sub-national statutory human rights institutions” (ICC 2013, 
25; APF
 
 2015, 23), and “independent and autonomous ombudsman, mediator and other national 
human rights institutions at…the local level” (UNGA 2013). To put it simply, SNHRIs may not 
yet be the focus of academic research, but the SNHRI is already a concept that is used by human 
rights practitioners. 
In addition to justifying a focus on SNHRIs as a meaningful concept, it is worth briefly 
justifying the usage of the term ‘SNHRI’ as a label for this concept. As a starting point, the term 
strives for familiarity. As Gerring (1999, 368-369) notes, finding a term in the existing lexicon 
that covers a concept is generally a better option than coining a neologism. As noted, the term 
‘SNHRI’ has been used by important actors. However, other similar terms have also been used. 
The term ‘SNHRI’ has a particular resonance and clarity that these other potential terms lack, 
though. It is resonant because it mirrors the terminology commonly used at the national level 
(‘NHRI’) and to a lesser extent the international level (‘regional human rights institution’). It is 
clear because the term ‘sub-national’ can immediately be understood as covering the entire 
administrative space below the nation-state (and only that space), while the term ‘local’ is 
sometimes used to denote solely municipal (and not higher level sub-national) space, and the 
term ‘regional’ can be used both for sub-national and supra-national space. 
III. Definition 
 Despite the fact that the SNHRI concept is meaningful and it (along with similar terms) 
has been used by practitioners in recent years, there is no accepted definition for the term. This 
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section stipulates a general definition for the term ‘SNHRI’. As a ‘general’ definition, it should 
be usable for any research purposes involving SNHRIs. It should also be usable by practitioners, 
although influencing the public discourse is not the primary focus of this article.
6
 This proposed 
definition will be ‘minimal’ in the sense that it seeks to “identify the bare essentials of a concept, 
sufficient to differentiate it extensionally without excluding any of the phenomena generally 
understood as part of the extension” (Gerring 2011, 135). In the context of this article, that 
means that my stipulated definition will apply to all SNHRIs and will not apply to any entities 
that are not SNHRIs. This is appropriate for facilitating academic research, which is this article’s 
objective. It is worth noting, however, that ideal-type definitions may be better suited for other 
purposes, such as promoting best practices (one example being the use of the Paris Principles to 
define the universe of NHRIs).
7
  
 The SNHRI definition is intended to fulfill four objectives. First, it is intended to 
approximate a general understanding of the SNHRI concept as constituting the sub-national 
equivalent of NHRIs. This understanding, which is stipulated in this article, is in line with 
existing usage of the concept (and term), which usually takes place in the context of discussion 
or research on NHRIs. This approximation does not lead to a neat end point, however, as the 
term ‘NHRI’ itself has itself been notoriously hard to define (Reif 2012). Second, it is intended 
to facilitate further academic research into the subject. This largely means stipulating a definition 
that allows researchers to feasibly identify whether an entity is or is not an SNHRI (i.e., is easily 
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 For example, without a general ‘SNHRI’ definition, listeners will not know what institutions 
the UN Secretary General was referring to, when he stated that “[i]nteraction by subnational 
human rights institutions with the international human rights system [are] strongly encouraged.” 
(UNSG 2011, para. 95). 
7
 The Paris Principles are a set of guidelines for national institutions promulgated by the UN in 
1993, which have been used to assess the mandate, autonomy, independence, pluralism, 
resources, and investigative powers of NHRIs (UNGA 1993).      
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operationalizable) and promoting group stability, so that entities will only rarely transition from 
SNHRI status to non-SNHRI status. Third, it strives for parsimony. As Gerring (2011, 34) notes, 
“good concepts do not have endless definitions.” Fourth, the definition is intended to be as 
precise as possible. This goal is consistent with the objective of facilitating academic research; as 
Rowe and Frewer (2005, 252) state, “[t]he more precise our definitions, the better (more reliably, 
validly) we can conduct research, the easier it is to interpret findings, and the greater the 
confidence we can have in our conclusions.” A precise definition does not end debate as to 
whether a particular entity possesses all the criteria of an SNHRI, however it can at least reduce 
or eliminate uncertainty as to what those criteria actually mean.   
Pursuant to the first of these objectives, it makes sense to use common NHRI definitions 
as a starting point for an SNHRI definition. Many have been proposed. NHRIs have been defined, 
inter alia, as: “independent bod[ies] established by a national government for the specific 
purpose of advancing and defending human rights at the domestic level” (Pohjolainen 2006, 1), 
“independent bodies that promote and monitor states’ implementation of and compliance with 
their obligations to protect human rights” (Dam 2007, 1), “[s]tate bodies with a constitutional 
and/or legislative mandate to protect and promote human rights … [that] are not under the direct 
authority of the executive, legislature or judiciary” (UNHCHR 2010, 13), and “official 
independent legal institutions established by the State by law for the promotion and protection of 
human rights” (APF  2015, 15). Oftentimes, NHRIs are simply defined as those entities that 
comply with the Paris Principles, as fleshed out by the General Recommendations of the 
GANHRI (Reif 2012, 53). However, while this may be satisfactory for defining the universe of 
NHRIs in some instances, it is unworkable for SNHRIs. The Paris Principles by their terms only 
apply to national-level institutions, and the GANHRI (with an exception for the Scottish and 
 11 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commissions) has not accepted sub-national bodies for full 
membership.
8
  
At their core, however, most NHRI definitions seem to contain three elements: 
independence; a link to the state (governmentality); and a focus on implementation of human 
rights norms. These three concepts – along with the sub-national level of operation – thus also 
form the core of my proposed definition, which is that an SNHRI is an independent non-judicial 
governmental institution that possess a sub-national mandate, and whose mission includes the 
implementation of human rights norms. While this definition should be adequate for a shorthand 
understanding of the SNHRI concept, it is intentionally parsimonious, and in the remainder of 
this section, I will elucidate the different elements of this definition. Specifically, I will focus on 
four tasks. First, I will justify the use of each term that is contained in my definition. Second, I 
will draw out the relevant terms at a second level of specificity, by proposing and justifying 
criteria that can be used to empirically establish whether the given term does or does not apply to 
a particular entity. Third, I will discuss the real-world definitional implications of certain terms 
with respect to particular entities’ inclusion or exclusion from the SNHRI definition. And fourth, 
I will where relevant acknowledge hard cases or limitations of the term’s usage. 
A. Independent 
Perhaps the most important distinguishing characteristic of NHRIs is their independence 
(Reif 2012, 52). Independence represents one of the fundamental aspirational values of the Paris 
Principles, and has been made explicit in multiple NHRI definitions (Pohjolainen 2006, 1; Dam 
2007, 1; APF
 
 2015, 15). The precise meaning of independence is not clear, however. At a 
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(UNGA 1993). 
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minimum, it means that an SNHRI should not operate under the direct authority of other 
governmental entities. In the case of NHRIs, however, some would go further to require a de 
facto absence of governmental influence into an institution’s actions. For SNHRIs, however, a 
definition that relies on de facto independence would not benefit group research. For one thing, 
there is no outside body such as the GANHRI to judge whether SNHRIs are de facto independent 
or not. Thus a researcher would be forced to individually evaluate each entities de facto 
independence, a herculean task given the thousands of SNHRIs in the world and difficulty in 
evaluating the level of governmental influence in their actions. In addition, the reliance on de 
jure rather than de facto independence leads to a more stable group. This is generally a benefit to 
research analysis; without such stability, one would have to recalibrate group membership 
constantly. 
Among the implications of the independence requirement is that a state or local 
governmental agency should not be considered an SNHRI (as, indeed, a national governmental 
agency would not be considered an NHRI). Several U.S. States possess human rights “divisions” 
or “agencies” that for this reason would for this reason not be considered SNHRIs. Another 
implication is that the local branch offices of NHRIs would not be considered SNHRIs, because 
they are not independent institutional entities. SNHRIs that are appointed by the executive but 
operate autonomously present a tricky classification, with actual independence depending on 
local administrative culture, length of term, and ease of dismissal, among other factors. However, 
these factors are hard to measure, and in line with the emphasis on de jure rather than de facto 
independence, I would argue that it makes sense to consider executive-appointed autonomous 
bodies to be independent as they are not normally intended to take instructions from government 
officials.  
 13 
B. Non-Judicial 
It is undisputed that courts are not NHRIs, although the two types of institutions share 
some similarities, such as independence, and courts often address human rights issues. This 
distinction is omitted in some NHRI definitions, perhaps because it would be considered an 
obvious point. Other scholars make this provision explicit, however (Reif 2004, 7), or specify 
that NHRIs are “administrative” bodies, which can be taken to mean non-judicial (Cardenas 
2014, 2). This same distinction should also apply at the sub-national level. This means that sub-
national human rights courts, as exist in India, Ontario, and elsewhere, would not be considered 
SNHRIs. On the other hand, where sub-national institutions issue non-binding rulings on human 
rights complaints outside of the judicial context, then they would be considered SNHRIs. 
Operationally, the distinction between courts and SNHRIs will usually be quite easy for the 
researcher to make based on institutional title: entities called courts and tribunals will generally 
be judicial in nature. Similarly, judicial officers will generally be called judges, tribunal officers 
or the like, while these terms will not normally be used for SNHRI workers.  
C. Governmental Institutions 
NHRIs are widely accepted to be ‘governmental’, in the sense that they are established by 
government (whether through statute, constitution or executive decree), funded through the 
governmental budget, and staffed wholly or partially by civil servants (UNHCHR 2010, 13). 
SNHRIs, thus, should also share this ‘governmental’ status. This means that local NGOs or 
community organizations, even those that attempt to be representative in nature, would not be 
considered SNHRIs (just as their national counterparts would not be considered NHRIs). In the 
sub-national context, measuring governmentality may be more complex than at the national level, 
however, because one would be more likely to find government-formed or sponsored institutions 
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that are operated solely by non-civil servants, examples being Japan’s Human Rights Protectors 
and many U.S. municipal human rights commissions.
 
It may also be possible to find human 
rights institutions that are entirely lacking in government funding, especially at the very local 
level. Given these peculiarities and this definition’s emphasis on parsimony, it makes sense to 
distinguish governmentality in the SNHRI context based solely on whether or not a human rights 
institution is governmentally established (whether by constitution, statute or decree). From an 
operational perspective, this criteria facilitates research because information on whether an 
institution is governmentally established or not can usually be located relatively easily by 
looking for the existence of an organic law, which is often posted on the institution’s website.   
D. That possess a sub-national mandate 
The term ‘sub-national’ is understood here to encompass “entities that are smaller than 
the nation (and not under or below it), such as regions, provinces, municipalities, member states 
of a federation, or cantons” (Homem de Siqueira 2010, 4, italics in original). Thus, although 
SNHRIs may sometimes be established by national-level legislation or decree, they in all cases 
focus their domestic human rights work in a jurisdictional sphere that is narrower geographically 
than the entire nation. SNHRIs may occasionally participate in international mechanisms or issue 
statements on overseas human rights abuses, just as some NHRIs do, but their domestic mandate 
must be restricted to a sub-national administrative space; this is evidently the most significant 
distinction between SNHRIs and NHRIs.  
While in most cases, it will be relatively simple to distinguish whether a human rights 
institution should be considered ‘national’ or ‘sub-national’, there will occasionally be difficult 
cases. For example, in some cases there will be human rights institutions in entities that are not 
universally recognized as nations, such as the Kosovo Ombudsman or Palestine’s Independent 
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Commission for Human Rights. There may also be institutions operating on entities that are 
universally unrecognized as states, but arguably possess the necessary attributes of statehood; 
examples include the Taiwanese Control Yuan and Somaliland Human Rights Commission. 
Finally, there are institutions located in entities that are sometimes called ‘nations’, even though 
they are clearly not nation-states under international law (such as Quebec, Scotland, or Native 
American nations). From an operational perspective, the easiest and most acceptable way of 
distinguishing nation-state status (and by extension sub-nationality) would be through an 
examination of UN membership status. If an entity is a member state or non-member observer 
state of the UN, then it should be considered a nation, and its human rights institution (if it has 
one) should be considered an NHRI. If, on the other hand, an entity is not a UN member or non-
member observer state, and is not supra-national in scope (i.e., composed of more than one 
nation), then its human rights institution should be considered a SNHRI. 
Another difficult question of classification arises with centralized human rights 
institutions that cover most of a nation’s territory, but not all of it. One example of this is the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission, which operates in England, Wales, and (for some 
issues) Scotland, but not in Northern Ireland (or, for that matter, in the U.K.’s Overseas 
Territories and Crown Dependencies). In practice, it seems appropriate to classify such 
institutions as NHRIs rather than SNHRIs, as long as they have been established by the national-
level government (as with the Equality and Human Rights Commission, established by the U.K. 
Parliament’s Equality Act 2006) and have a mandate that covers the majority of a nation’s 
population. This choice is justified by the prerogative of avoiding overlap between the class of 
institutions normally recognized as NHRIs (such as the Equality and Human Rights Commission) 
and the class recognized as SNHRIs. 
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E. Mission includes 
 By stating that human rights implementation must be ‘included’ in the institution’s 
mission, this formulation implies that an SNHRI may have other missions besides human rights 
implementation. Thus, under this definition, those ombudsman offices that have a mission that 
includes human rights implementation (as well as addressing maladministration, corruption, etc.) 
would be considered SNHRIs. This is consistent with certain statements of the UN General 
Assembly, Committee on Economic and Social Cultural Rights, Committee on the Rights of the 
Child and many European actors that classical ombudsman institutions at the national and sub-
national level can be considered NHRIs, despite the fact that their work is not confined to solely 
human rights issues (Reif 2012, 55; 71-72). It does, however, run counter to the GANHRI’s 
practice of refusing to fully accredit classical ombudsman institutions or refer to them as NHRIs 
(Reif 2012, 71). A separate question is whether the human rights missions must be explicit in the 
institution’s mandate. I would argue that an explicit human rights mission should be considered 
unnecessary. From a functional perspective, it seems illogical for an SNHRI definition to 
exclude those institutions that have evolved a practice of human rights implementation, simply 
because their organic legislation does not explicitly refer to human rights. The downside of this 
choice, however, is that it complicates classification, as it is more difficult to examine an 
institution’s practice than simply review its organic statute or decree, and it forces a somewhat 
arbitrary decision of how much human rights implementation is required to turn a classical 
ombudsman institution into an SNHRI. In practice, however, the large majority of classical 
ombudsman institutions are likely to be involved in human rights protection (broadly 
understood), even if this is often confined to implementation of administrative procedure rights 
(Remac 2013, 66).  
 17 
F. Implementation 
The term ‘implementation’ has been used to cover broadly the different ways in which 
sub-national institutions use human rights in their work, including protective tasks, such as 
complaint-handling, promotional tasks such as education, advocacy, and awareness-raising, 
along with human rights monitoring and advising. This is consistent with the Sepulveda et al. 
(2004, 67) definition of ‘implementation’ as “all initiatives taken…to enhance respect for human 
rights and prevent violations”, as well as the broad scope given to the phrase ‘human rights 
implementation’ by some scholars writing about NHRIs (De Beco 2010, Baik 2012). 9  I 
consciously avoid the phrase ‘promotion and protection’, which has occasionally been used in 
NHRI definitions (APF
 
 2015, 15). First, the term ‘promotion and protection’ has always been a 
rather confusing formulation that leaves uncertainties as to what activities actually fall under 
each rubric. Second, the conjunctive term ‘promotion and protection’ is often used to encompass 
both awareness raising activities and complaint handling activities. In practice, however, 
SNHRIs tend to be smaller than NHRIs in budgetary and staffing terms, and therefore it is more 
common for SNHRIs to focus solely on one or the other types of tasks (while still being widely 
seen as human rights institutions). 
G. Human rights norms 
 The proposed definition concludes by noting that implementation can involve ‘human 
rights norms’. By not specifying that ‘all’ human rights norms must be implemented, this clause 
thus implicitly includes within the SNHRI definition those bodies that focus on a subset of the 
human rights corpus, such as anti-discrimination, women’s rights, administrative rights, or 
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 Other scholars, however, use the term ‘implementation’ more narrowly, to refer to legislative 
actions or programmatic initiatives to facilitate the enjoyment of human rights in a community, 
which are undertaken alongside human rights ‘protection’ (complaint handling) or ‘promotion’ 
(training or awareness-raising). 
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children’s rights. One difficult issue is whether bodies that implement ‘civil right’ or 
‘constitutional right’ norms should be considered human rights institutions. In practice, it will 
likely be very rare for such organizations to entirely ignore human rights language in today’s 
world, but from a functional perspective, the language used seems of little importance; the 
important thing is that human rights norms are being implemented, regardless of their specific 
legal source or the name used.  
On the other hand, it does seem logical (and consistent with NHRI definitions and 
general usage) to require that entities explicitly implement human rights of some sort (whether 
from international, national or local sources) in order to qualify as an SNHRI. Thus, while an 
electoral commission clearly furthers the implementation of political rights, it normally would 
not explicitly rely on human rights norms or rights discourse in its day to day work. It would 
therefore not be an SNHRI. Similarly, an anti-corruption commission that relies on 
administrative law, but not ‘human rights’ as such, would not be considered an SNHRI, even 
though anti-corruption work can reasonably be formulated as the promotion of a right to good 
governance. 
IV. Typology 
While SNHRIs present a useful concept for study, they also vary in significant ways. 
Academic research should take into account these different types where relevant. This section 
therefore proposes a general typology of SNHRIs with the objective of facilitating research into 
SNHRIs.
10
 As with the proposed definition, this proposed typology will comply with the basic 
rules for social science classifications.  Thus, this typology is constructed so as to be 
                                                          
10
 As with my proposed definition, a secondary objective of this typology is to promote greater 
clarity in the public discourse surrounding SNHRIs. Typologies can assist communication by 
allowing for greater linguistic precision when referring to specific subsets of the broader concept.   
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comprehensive and non-exclusive, meaning that all possible SNHRIs can be categorized in one 
(and only one) of the possible types and the typology will aim for the minimization of within-
group variance and maximization of between-group variance (Kluge 2000, para. 2).  
Within those parameters, this typology is also constructed so as to be relevant, 
parsimonious and feasible. Relevance means that the divisions resulting from this typology 
should correspond to divisions that are most likely to be studied by researchers. Parsimony 
means that the divisions created by this typology are kept at a minimum, so as to avoid 
overwhelming the researcher with relatively insignificant distinctions. Feasibility means that 
researchers should be able to categorize SNHRIs within one of the possible types using readily 
accessible information.  
Pursuant to these objectives, this article proposes a SNHRI typology based on three 
dimensions, namely administrative level, institutional form, and breadth of mandate. These 
dimensions were chosen for four reasons. First, they correspond to common ways of classifying 
NHRIs and other human rights institutions (thus facilitating comparative research). Second, they 
correspond to common categories of existing sub-national research, allowing for a better 
understanding of the applicability of existing research to particular types of SNHRIs. Third, 
these dimensions to a certain extent describe distinct institutional histories, functions and 
mandates, thus promoting the goal of minimizing within-group variance. And fourth, these 
dimensions can be relatively easily measured by researchers, unlike, for example, capacity, 
effectiveness, or de facto independence, all of which are important attributes but very difficult to 
measure. The typology presented will be a nominal taxonomy, with three administrative level 
categories, two institutional form categories (which are sub-divided into a total of five sub-
categories), and three breadth of mandate categories. This allows for eighteen possible first-level 
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institutional types, or forty-five possible types when the second-level institutional form 
categories are used. 
Each of these proposed categories will be delineated with precision below, while 
providing illustrative examples. I will then note if there are any commonalities or typical 
characteristics of each type. This is important as a means of justifying the choice of categories: 
good typological categories will highlight similarities among types in a category that go beyond 
those distinctions stipulated in the typology itself (Kaplan 1964, 51). The proposed typology 
differs from common NHRI typologies in two important ways. First, it is a multi-variable 
typology. This contrasts with NHRI typologies, which generally classify NHRIs based on one 
variable, often labeled as institutional type (see, e.g., Kjearum 2003, 8-9; Pohjolainen 2006, 16). 
Second, it is logically exclusive. Typical NHRI typologies denote a selection of established 
institutional types (such as ‘human rights ombudsman’ or ‘human rights commission’), while 
neglecting to categorize logically conceivable institutions that fall outside these categories.   
A. Administrative Level 
 SNHRIs have been established at many different sub-national levels, including villages, 
towns, counties, states, oblasts, provinces, cantons, and regions. As will be discussed below, 
SNHRIs tend to have somewhat different histories, functions, and characteristics, depending on 
the administrative level at which they operate, so administrative level presents an obvious 
dimension to distinguish SNHRI types. It is difficult to neatly delineate categories, however, 
because the names, powers, sizes, and governmental structures of sub-national administrative 
levels vary quite widely by country (and in some cases, even within a country). For the purposes 
of SNHRI classification, this typology proposes three relevant administrative levels, labeled as 
provincial, local, and autonomous regional levels. Each of these are defined and described below. 
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1. Provincial SNHRI 
The first category encompasses SNHRIs established at the highest standard sub-national 
governmental level, labeled here as ‘provincial SNHRIs’. Of course, different countries have 
very different terminology for administrative divisions, and U.S. states, French départements, 
German Länder, etc., are all considered ‘provinces’ for the purpose of this typology.11 Examples 
of provincial SNHRIs include the Karnataka State Human Rights Commission (India), the 
Victoria Ombudsman (Australia), and the Sindic de Greuges de Catalunya (Spain). 
While provincial SNHRIs exist in a variety of locations, they are particularly common in 
two types of countries. First, provincial SNHRIs are often found in countries where the highest 
sub-national administrative subdivisions possess significant policy-making powers and 
administrative autonomy, as is the case with federal or devolved systems of government. This is 
unsurprising, as division of powers reasons would suggest that such communities would be likely 
to favor autonomy in human rights implementation. Thus, for example, all or most provinces (or 
their equivalent) in Mexico, Russia, Argentina, the United States, Australia, and Spain possess 
SNHRIs.  
Provincial SNHRIs also tend to show certain common characteristics. In most nations 
with provincial SNHRIs, the SNHRIs are of the same institutional form at the provincial level as 
the NHRI at the national level (i.e., commissions or ombudsmen), and interact with the NHRI in 
a variety of ways (Wolman 2013). In some cases (most notably Russia, India, and Mexico), the 
NHRI establishing legislation also authorizes the establishment of SNHRIs at the provincial level. 
SNHRIs at the provincial level tend to be larger than local SNHRIs, and, relative to local 
                                                          
11
 Conversely, the Provincias in Spain or Provinces in Belgium would not be considered 
‘provinces’ for the purpose of this typology, because in each case there exist a higher sub-
national administrative level. 
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SNHRIs, it is more common for provincial SNHRIs to actively engage in international human 
rights mechanisms (Wolman 2014).  
2. Local SNHRIs 
The label ‘local SNHRIs’ refers to SNHRIs established at a standard sub-provincial 
administrative subdivision (i.e., at the second or lower level of sub-national administration). This 
can include SNHRIs in counties, cities, towns, villages, and other similar administrative 
designations. Examples include the Boston Commission for Persons with Disabilities (USA), the 
Personería Municipal de Santiago de Cali (Colombia), and the Barcelona Human Rights 
Observatory (Spain). Local SNHRIs are quite common in cities big and small in the United 
States, Colombia, Argentina, and Italy. Elsewhere, local SNHRIs have tended to be established 
in larger cities (such as Montreal or Seoul), and in certain municipalities that want to promote 
their connection to human rights in a visible way, such as Gwangju (Korea) or Graz (Austria). 
Local SNHRIs can also be established at the village or neighborhood level; this is quite common 
in Japan and the Philippines. 
In the United States, municipal race relations commissions (many of which eventually 
evolved into human rights commissions) existed prior to World War II (Saunders and Bang 
2007), but in other countries, local SNHRIs tend to be more recently established. The first local 
classical ombudsman was established in 1967 in Jerusalem, and it is only in the post-Cold War 
era that local ombudsmen with an explicit human rights mandate have become common (Danet 
1989, 16). Local SNHRIs are frequently of a different institutional type than the home country’s 
NHRI; for example Gwangju and Yogyakarta have ombudsmen, while Korea and Indonesia have 
human rights commissions. While there are certain exceptions (such as Colombia, where each 
municipality is required to have a Personero Local (Program Presidencial de Derechos Humanos 
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y DIH 2009, 20)), in general, local SNHRIs are unlikely to be required by legislation at higher 
administrative levels, and are more likely to emerge from local initiatives. 
3. Autonomous Region SNHRIs 
Finally, there are a number of SNHRIs established in sub-national regions that can be 
qualified as non-standard because they possess a significantly higher degree of autonomy than 
similarly situated administrative units in a particular country. These are here termed 
‘autonomous region SNHRIs’. One sees a relatively high frequency of SNHRIs in autonomous 
regions. Examples include the Hong Kong Equal Opportunities Commission (China), the 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (UK), and the Ȧland Discrimination Ombudsman 
(Finland).  This frequency is unsurprising; in these places, the NHRI (if there is one) might be 
distant, mistrusted, or lacking in authority to influence regional actors.  
SNHRIs in autonomous regions tend to be similar to NHRIs in their function and 
mandate, as one would expect given the greater regulatory powers of autonomous entities. 
Autonomous region SNHRIs are not generally relegated to a level hierarchically below the 
NHRI, as is sometimes the case with other NHRIs at the provincial level (Wolman 2013). They 
also tend to be relatively active internationally, and, in a few instances, have applied for 
accreditation by the GANHRI (Wolman 2015b, 124-125).   
B. Institutional Form 
Institutional form is the variable that is most commonly used to typologize NHRIs, 
although the number of institutional forms that are specified varies widely. Some scholars note 
two types: national commissions and national ombudsmen (Steinerte and Murray 2009, 54-56; 
Cardenas 2014, 9). Others have broken down NHRIs into three categories (Centre for Human 
Rights 1995, 7-8), four categories (Pohjolainen 2006, 16), or even five or six (International 
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Council on Human Rights Policy 2000, 4; Kjearum 2003, 8-9), by including other institutional 
forms such as advisory committees on human rights, human rights ombudsmen and specialized 
institutions. These typologies are generally non-comprehensive, however, because it is logically 
possible for an NHRI to exist that does not fall into any of these types as normally defined.  
For the sake of feasibility and comprehensiveness, this typology opts for a somewhat 
different strategy, by dividing SNHRIs into monocratic institutions and multi-person institutions. 
For many research purposes, this distinction will be sufficient. One might, for example, be 
interested in comparing whether multi-person institutions are more effective than monocratic 
institutions or receive greater support from the local population.
12
 In some instances, however, 
more precision will be helpful when dealing with institutional forms. For example, one might 
want to explore whether certain research findings related to national classical ombudsmen are 
also true for sub-national classical ombudsmen. Therefore, these two higher-level categories are 
divided into five sub-categories, namely classical ombudsmen, human rights ombudsmen, and 
idiosyncratic institutions (which are all monocratic), and human rights commissions and human 
rights councils (which are multi-person). These are detailed below. 
1. Monocratic Institutions 
 For the purposes of this typology, monocratic SNHRIs (defined as single-person SNHRIs 
or SNHRI offices managed by a single person) are categorized as one institutional form. There is 
a high degree of within-group similarity among monocratic SNHRIs. While there is some 
variation in their functions, powers, mandates, and appointment procedures, the vast majority of 
these institutions would self-identify as ombudsman institutions, or some variants thereof 
(although they go by many different names, such as Defensores del Pueblo, Provedores de 
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 At the national level, this monocratic/multi-person typology is utilized by Conrad et al. (2012, 
10) in their NHRI dataset (although labeled as ombudsman/human rights commissions). 
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Justiça, Difensori Civici, and Médiateurs. Conversely, virtually all self-identified ombudsman 
institutions would be contained within this category, as ombudsman institutions are almost 
always monocratic (Cardenas 2014, 9) and are occasionally defined as such (Colín and Colín 
2007, 190). The individual ombudsman may head an institutional entity or be given resources to 
appoint a staff, but this is not always the case, especially at the local level. 
As (in large part) ombudsman variants, most monocratic SNHRIs share a common 
heritage. Ombudsman institutions originated in Sweden in 1809, and spread throughout 
Scandinavia over the next 150 years before spreading to other regions of the world in the 1960s 
(Reif 2004, 1). At the sub-national level, municipal ombudsman first emerged in Europe in the 
1970s,
13
 and while sub-national ombudsmen may not have engaged with human rights to a 
significant extent at that time, over the last two decades many have begun to explicitly 
implement human rights norms, not only in Europe (Pihlajassari and Skard 2011, 9-10), but also 
in Latin America (Van Leeuwen and Merino 2008, 11; 15) and, increasingly, Asia.
14
 At their 
most basic level, ombudsmen are independent governmentally appointed actors tasked with 
supervising the executive’s administrative activities, through receiving and investigating 
complaints from the public and making non-binding recommendations on the resolution of those 
complaints (Reif 2004, 1-2). 
Beyond that very basic level, ombudsman institutions have evolved considerably from 
their Swedish roots, such that the broad institutional form now encompasses many different 
variants. While traditionally ombudsmen were selected by the legislature, contemporary 
ombudsmen are sometimes appointed by the executive or (rarely) directly elected (Reif 2004, 30-
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 Europe’s first local ombudsman institution was established in Zürich in 1971 (Dünser 2004).  
14
 For example, Korea now has thirteen local human rights ombudsmen (Korea Human Rights 
Foundation 2014, 208-211).  
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31). In addition to sub-national and national ombudsmen, there are now ombudsmen at the 
supranational level (U.N. and E.U.), as well as in private sector organizations and individual 
departments or ministries of larger organizations (Reif 2004, 26-28). There are ombudsmen with 
general competencies, as well as those that focus on specific subject areas. Most importantly for 
present purposes, there are ombudsmen who are mandated to protect human rights and those that 
are not. This is highlighted below as a distinguishing factor for second-level categories. 
a. Classical Ombudsman Institutions 
 Classical ombudsman institutions can be defined as monocratic SNHRIs that are 
ombudsman institutions, and whose mandate does not explicitly mention human rights. The 
existence or non-existence of an explicit human rights mandate mirrors definitions sometimes 
given to classic ombudsman institutions at the national level, which is important in order to 
promote comparative research that deals with both national and sub-national entities (Saari 2010, 
33). This criteria has also been previously used to distinguish between classical and human rights 
ombudsmen at the sub-national level (Stuhmcke 2011, 43).   
Consistent with their institutional heritage, classical ombudsmen are focused on resolving 
complaints of administrative wrongs, most notably governmental acts of administrative 
unfairness, noncompliance with the law, and maladministration (Tai 2010, 2). Of course, in 
doing so classical ombudsmen may simultaneously be addressing human rights violations (Reif 
2004, 2).  Despite this fact, some classical ombudsmen avoid using human rights in their work 
altogether, especially in the Asia-Pacific region and areas with common law legal systems 
(Burdekin 2007, 86). Many other classical ombudsmen do implement human rights norms in 
their work, despite the lack of an explicit mandate, especially in continental Europe (Dünser 
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2004). Some examples of classical ombudsman SNHRIs include the Hong Kong Ombdusman, 
the Saskatchewan Ombudsman and the Québec Protecteur du Citoyen (Reif 2004, 393).  
b. Human Right Ombudsman Institutions 
Human rights ombudsman institutions have been defined as ombudsman institutions that 
have an explicit human rights implementation mandate (Byrnes and Renshaw 2014, 472). In 
addition to the resolution of human rights violation complaints, human rights ombudsmen may 
also engage in human rights documentation, policy research, government advising, and 
educational activities. This human rights mandate usually is present in addition to (and not 
instead of) the administrative fairness and legality mandate common in classical ombudsmen 
(Pegram 2010, 736). In terms of composition, appointment procedures and basic functions, there 
is little to separate human rights ombudsmen and classical ombudsmen (Pegram 2010, 736).  
At the national level, human rights ombudsmen date back to the 1970s democratization 
movements of Southern Europe and the establishment of the Portuguese Provedor de Justiça and 
the Spanish Defensor del Pueblo (Reif 2004, 8). Since that time, human rights ombudsmen have 
been established with particular frequency throughout Latin America and Central and Eastern 
Europe, both at the national and sub-national levels (Reif 2004, 9). To a lesser extent, there has 
been some movement of sub-national institutions from the classical ombudsman institution 
category to the human rights ombudsman category due to legislative revision of their mandates 
(Reif 2011, 271-272). With a few exceptions, human rights ombudsmen are found today in civil 
law jurisdictions (Reif 2011, 272). Examples include the Ombudsman for Children of the 
Republic of Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Defensor del Pueblo de la Ciudad de Buenos 
Aires (Argentina), and the Puerto Rican Oficina del Procurador del Ciudadano (USA). 
c. Idiosyncratic types 
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While it is true that the vast majority of self-identified ombudsman institutions are 
monocratic, it is not necessarily the case that all monocratic SNHRIs are ombudsmen. Thus, in 
order to maintain its logical comprehensiveness, this typology must allow for the possibility of 
non-ombudsman monocratic SNHRIs through the creation of a catch-all category, labeled here 
as idiosyncratic types. In practice, however, non-ombudsman monocratic SNHRIs are rare or 
non-existent in most parts of the world. Two exceptions are Japan and the Philippines, where 
Local Human Rights Protectors (in Japan) and Barangay Human Rights Action Officers (in the 
Philippines) are widespread. In each country, there are in fact several thousand such institutions 
at the neighborhood level, with office-holders explicitly mandated to engage in human rights 
promotion and education as well as handling complaints from the public (Koike 2014, 80; 
Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines 2009, 60). 
2. Multi-person SNHRIs 
 Multi-person SNHRIs are the logical counterpart to monocratic institutions. Given the 
wide diversity in multi-person SNHRIs, they can perhaps most easily be characterized in 
reference to their contrasts with monocratic ombudsmen. For one thing, they do not all handle 
complaints from the public (although some do). In addition, they are more likely to focus on 
other civil society actors as well as governmental human rights abuse (Centre for Human Rights 
1995, 9; Tai 2010, 7) and they are more likely to address economic and social rights issues than 
are ombudsmen. Multi-person SNHRIs are also by their nature more able to be pluralistic in their 
make-up, including in many cases through the appointment of non-governmental members. 
While this broad category will suffice for most research purposes, multi-person SNHRIs can also 
be divided into two sub-types, based on function, here labeled as human rights commissions and 
human rights councils.  
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a. Human Rights Commissions 
Multi-person SNHRIs that are primarily concerned with human rights protection 
(complaint handling) or promotion (including awareness raising, and the provision of education 
or training) can be classified as ‘human rights commissions’. Examples would include the 
Eugene (Oregon) Human Rights Commission (USA), the Kerala State Commission for 
Protection of Child Rights (India), and the Cayman Islands Human Rights Commission (UK). 
Human rights commissions are most common at the national level in countries with a common 
law tradition, and the same is true at the sub-national level.  At the state or provincial level, 
human rights commissions have existed for at least twenty years in the United States, Canada, 
India and Australia. Outside of the United States, commission forms tend to be less common at 
the local level.  
b. Human Rights Councils 
On the other hand, multi-person SNHRIs that are primarily concerned with human rights 
monitoring or advising the government on human rights issues (which are often two sides of the 
same coin), can be classified as ‘human rights councils’. Examples include the Advisory Council 
on Human Rights of the City of Graz (Austria); the Observatorio de Equidad de Género de 
Buenos Aires (Argentina), and the Conselho Permanente dos Direitos Humanos do Estado do 
Paraná (Brazil). Human rights councils are usually relatively new creations, and some have 
emerged as a result of transnational initiatives such as the Human Rights Cities movement 
(Oomen and Baumgärtel 2014). In Argentina and Brazil, issue-specific sub-national human 
rights monitors have also been formed to monitor the treatment of prisoners in detention facilities. 
These institutions were established in order to comply with the Optional Protocol for the 
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Convention Against Torture, which requires that state parties designate or establish one or 
several independent national preventive mechanisms. 
C. Breadth of Mandate 
The third dimension that is measured in this SNHRI typology is the breadth of the 
institution’s human rights mandate. This is broken down into three categories, namely broad-
based SNHRIs, anti-discrimination SNHRIs, and single-issue SNHRIs. Breadth of mandate is an 
important dimension for functional reasons, as it relates to the types of issues an SNHRI 
addresses, the sources of law that it uses, and in some cases even the peers that an SNHRI 
networks with, as there exist separate trans-governmental networks for children’s ombudsmen or 
anti-discrimination commissions.  
1. Broad-based SNHRIs 
Broad-based SNHRIs can be defined as SNHRIs that implement a broad range of 
different types of human rights. In most cases, their mandate will include both civil and political 
rights and economic and social rights. Sometimes the scope of the mandate is explicitly 
calibrated to international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and/or 
human rights treaties ratified at the national level (Wolman 2015a 229-231).  In many other 
circumstances, however, the sources of human rights are not specified, but rather the commission 
is left to self-define the exact types of rights included in its mandate (Wolman 2015a 233-234). 
Broad-based SNHRIs tend to be relatively recently established, and are particularly common in 
Europe and Latin America. In some cases they exist alongside more specialized SNHRIs (often 
dealing with women’s or children’s rights) or may have sub-offices that specialize in particular 
types of rights. Examples of broad-based SNHRIs include the Seattle Human Rights 
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Commission (USA), the Independent Commission for Human Rights in the Kurdistan Region 
(Iraq), and the Conseil Lyonnais pour le Respect des Droits (France). 
2. Equality SNHRIs 
The second category proposed is equality SNHRIs, defined here as SNHRIs that 
implement general equality or non-discrimination rights, but not other types of human rights. 
Examples include the Anti-Discrimination Commission of Queensland (Australia), the Humboldt 
County (CA) Human Rights Commission (USA), and the Espoo Equality Committee (Finland). 
In most cases, equality SNHRIs are commission-form institutions, although there are some 
ombudsman examples. Equality SNHRIs are most prevalent in common law countries, where 
they tend to have a relatively long history (Dam 2007, 2). However, there is a trend in common 
law countries towards the broadening of mandates, and some former equality commissions in the 
U.S. and Canada now deal with the full range of human rights norms (Wolman 2015a, 230).  
3. Issue-Specific SNHRIs 
There are other SNHRIs that have mandates that are confined to one particular 
substantive issue or protected group, labeled here as issue-specific SNHRIs. Examples include 
the Alexandria (VA) Commission on Persons with Disabilities (US), the Shizuoka City Gender 
Equality Advisory Committee (Japan), and the Madrid Defensor del Menor (Spain). The most 
common issue that SNHRIs focus on is children’s rights. Sub-national commissions and 
ombudsmen specializing in children’s rights have become increasing common all around the 
world in recent years, following their earlier establishment at the national level (Ruggiera 2013, 
71). Many of these Commissions are guided by international norms, especially the CRC 
(Wolman 2015a 230-231). As is the case on the national level, there are many cases of single 
issue SNHRIs existing alongside broad-based or equality SNHRIs.  
 32 
V. Conclusion 
Whenever a new concept emerges, defining and typologizing the concept are important 
steps towards understanding and researching it. This article has contributed to that objective by 
defining and classifying SNHRIs. It is worth noting that the choices made in conceptualizing and 
typologizing SNHRIs (or indeed any concept) have real consequences (Coppedge 2012, 33). 
They influence research agendas, datasets, and comparisons, and impact the generalizability of 
case studies. To the extent that these choices are accepted in the broader community, they also 
influence how institutions are thought about and think about themselves (Eppler and Mengis 
2011, 7). For example, once human rights actors started to think of national ombudsmen and 
human rights commissions as ‘NHRIs’, one saw a gradual isomorphism (or trend toward 
similarity), as pressure mounted to adapt to the NHRI ideal espoused in the Paris Principles 
(Cardenas 2014, 352). Similar processes could occur if institutions view themselves as SNHRIs 
rather than municipal human rights commissions or other traditional types.  
Developing a new concept also inevitably has an effect on our understanding of 
neighboring concepts (Gerring 2011, 128). In this case, a definition and typology of SNHRIs 
could have an effect on our understanding of NHRIs as well. To give one example, the Scottish 
Human Rights Commission is often referred to as an NHRI (and often refers to itself as such). It 
has also been fully accredited as a national institution by the GANHRI. If, however, the SNHRI 
definition proposed here is accepted, then the Scottish Human Rights Commission would clearly 
be considered an SNHRI. To the extent that SNHRIs are viewed as a non-overlapping 
counterpart set to NHRIs, this could lead other actors to rethink whether the Scottish Human 
Rights Commission should really be treated as an NHRI. 
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The fact that defining and typologizing SNHRIs leads to real-world effects does not, of 
course, mean that they are unwarranted tasks. On the contrary, they are necessary for the 
promotion of high quality research. The importance of definition and classification means that 
they should be undertaken explicitly and scientifically, with choices justified and reasoning made 
clear. That is what I have attempted to accomplish in this article. 
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